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COVID-19 and Social Distancing in the Absence of Legal Enforcement:  
Survey Evidence from Japan 
 
Abstract 
Do people keep social distance to mitigate the infection risk of COVID-19, even without 
aggressive policy interventions? The Japanese government did not restrict individuals’ 
activities despite the early confirmation of infections, and as a result, economic damages 
were limited in the initial stage of infection spread. Exploiting these features, we examine 
the association between the subsequent increase in infections and voluntary social-
distancing behavior. Using unique monthly panel survey data, we find that the increase 
in risk is associated with the likelihood of social-distancing behavior. However, those 
with lower educational attainment are less responsive, implying their higher exposure to 
infections. We provide evidence that this can be attributed to their underestimation of 
infection risk. These results suggest the utility of interventions incorporating nudges to 
raise risk perception. 
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1. Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused immense human losses worldwide. To mitigate the 
infection spread, it is essential for individuals to maintain appropriate social or physical 
distance from one another (Fenichel, 2013; Fenichel et al., 2011; Ipsen, 1959).1 However, 
it can be difficult to achieve sufficient levels of distancing through voluntary individual 
compliance alone, because of attendant economic costs and uncertainties about 
transmission risk. 2  Therefore, many governments have sought to enforce social 
distancing through various interventions, such as closing public transportation and 
workplaces, making viral or antibody tests available to anybody, and providing financial 
support (Hale et al. 2020). However, an obvious concern regarding aggressive regulations 
is their economic consequences (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Inoue and Todo, 2020; Lin and 
Meissner, 2020). In the United States, the unemployment rate jumped from 4.4% in 
March 2020 to 14.7% in April. Therefore, some countries have begun to lift social 
distancing requirements to restart economic activities, generating a new argument about 
whether governments can cope with the next wave of infections without relying on costly 
regulations. However, to the best of our knowledge, the extent to which individuals 
maintain social distance in the absence of aggressive regulation remains largely 
unexplored. 
 This study bridges this knowledge gap by examining the case of Japan during 
 
1 Social distancing or physical distancing is defined as the practice of keeping physical 
space between oneself and other people outside of the home. This includes staying at 
least six feet from other people, not gathering in groups, staying out of crowded places, 
and avoiding mass gatherings (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). 
2 Decision-making under uncertainty is subject to various cognitive biases (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1972). In particular, the normalcy bias causes people to underestimate the 
probability and severity of transmission risk. 
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the initial phase of the COVID-19 infection spread, prior to the announcement of a state 
of emergency on April 7th, 2020. The Japanese government was less interventionist than 
other countries, in that it did not restrict residents’ activities or provide financial support. 
Reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) tests were not made widely 
available. Rather, the government simply requested that citizens maintain social distance 
and stay home voluntarily. Exploiting these features, this study analyzes the extent to 
which social-distancing behavior—such as face-to-face conversation, use of public 
transportation, and dining outside—changed with the increase in infection risk between 
January and March 2020. This study also uncovers obstacles to social-distancing behavior, 
such as income opportunity costs, poor access to information, and the underestimation of 
transmission risks. Disentangling these obstacles allows us to discuss the interactive roles 
between individuals’ responses and public policies. For example, if people do not modify 
their behavior due to the underestimation of infection risks, then interventions that elevate 
risk perceptions should mitigate the spread of COVID-19 effectively, without the need 
for more drastic restrictions on activities. 
 Using original survey data, we regress changes in social-distancing behavior on 
the monthly average of confirmed cases per day in each prefecture, the main unit of 
subnational government in Japan. We discuss potential threats to identification carefully, 
particularly reverse causality and sample selection. Considering the absence of a natural 
experimental condition, it is difficult to fully rule out these possibilities. However, we 
provide evidence that these biases are unlikely to be severe, and if anything should work 
against our central hypotheses. 
 We find that the increase in the number of confirmed cases significantly 
encourages respondents to take social-distancing behavior. However, the effect is smaller 
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among the less educated, implying that exposure to infections may not be equal across 
individuals. We also provide suggestive evidence that the heterogeneous impact is mainly 
attributable to differences in the perception of infection risk. These results suggest the 
importance of interventions that incorporate nudges to heighten perceptions of risk.  
This study is most closely related to Barrios and Hochberg (2020), who examine 
the impact of obtaining information about infection spread on perceptions of risk and 
social-distancing behavior in the U.S. A key distinction between this study and theirs is 
that their work analyzes social distancing after the government started to restrict residents’ 
activities in the U.S., while we study Japan before the government intervened. The 
findings of this study are also in line with those of Muto et al. (2020) and Machida et al. 
(2020) that examine social distancing in Japan, Kushner Gadarian et al. (2020) in the U.S., 
and Barari et al. (2020) in Italy. In particular, Muto et al. (2020) also find less behavioral 
change among those with lower socio-economic status, although they do not test the 
potential reasons for the heterogeneity.  
This study is also related to the literature of health inequality. Existing studies 
demonstrate the association between socio-economic status and health status (Balia and 
Jones, 2008; Cutler et al., 2008; Doorslaer et al., 2004; Kawachi et al., 2010; Williams et 
al., 1997; Winkleby et al., 1992). Researchers consider this relationship to be mediated 
by differences in health behavior, access to health care, exposure to health risk, and stress 
(Adler and Newman, 2002; Kristenson et al., 2004; Maurer, 2009). Others argue that 
knowledge and perception of health risk play pivotal roles in predicting health behavior, 
such as smoking, substance abuse, purchase of health insurance, immunization, and 
disaster evacuation (Apostolidis et al., 2006; Lin and Sloan, 2015; Lundborg and 
Andersson, 2008; Riad et al., 2006; Schaller et al., 2019; Zhou-Richter et al., 2010). In 
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line with these works, our data support the hypothesis that differences in the perception 
and knowledge of health risks across education levels cause the heterogeneity in health 
behavior. 
 The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the infection 
spread and government responses in Japan. Sections 3 and 4 describe the dataset and 
identification strategy, respectively. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 disentangles 
the obstacles to social-distancing behavior, and finally Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Infection Spread of COVID-19 in Japan (January to March 24th, 2020) 
On December 31st in 2019, the WHO China Country Office was informed of cases of 
pneumonia of unknown causes in Wuhan City, China. Due to its geographical proximity 
to China and frequent bilateral travel for tourism and business, Japan was one of the 
earliest countries to confirm COVID-19 cases outside of China, following Thailand 
(WHO, 2020). According to the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), the 
first case in Japan was confirmed on January 15th, 2020 in Kanagawa, a region in the 
suburb of Tokyo, and 15 more cases were reported by the end of January (Figure 1).3 
Most of these cases (13 out of 16) were attributed to visitors and returnees from China. 
The first report of human-to-human transmission, however, appeared in January 28th in 
Nara, a tourist site in western Japan. 
[Figure 1] 
        In February, the virus gradually and silently spread in several rural prefectures 
 
3 Information on the number of confirmed cases is available from the MHLW website 
(https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/index.html, accessed on May 6th, 2020). 
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in addition to large cities. By February 10th, 28 cases had been confirmed, of which 15 
were Japanese residents.4 Infection of medical workers began to appear in the second 
half of the month. Serious cluster cases were also found in late February, including the 
participants of a snow festival in Hokkaido, the northern-most prefecture of Japan. By the 
end of February, a total of 239 cases were reported, of which 69 were in Hokkaido. 
However, more than half of the 47 prefectures had not yet confirmed any cases, and even 
populated prefectures, such as Miyagi and Osaka, had found only a few cases (Figure 2).  
[Figure 2] 
 Infection spread accelerated in March. More populated prefectures started to find 
new cases regularly, and over 10 prefectures announced their first cases in the first week 
of March. While about 30 cases were found nationwide each day until the 9th, a big jump 
occurred on the 10th, when 70 cases were reported. Around the same time, fatalities from 
COVID-19 started being reported regularly.  
 
2.2. Government Response and Economic Consequences 
Despite the confirmation of infected citizens earlier than most countries, the national 
government’s response was comparatively passive. It gradually tightened immigration 
controls for visitors from Hubei Province, China, and also asked Japanese residents in 
Wuhan to return to Japan in the beginning of February. However, in stark contrast to other 
countries that closed public transportation and workplaces, there was no legal regulation 
of residents’ activities in Japan. In fact, as late as early April, the prime minister 
emphasized that there was no need to declare a state of emergency and only requested 
 
4 Around the same time, passengers of the Diamond Princess, a cruise ship, tested 
positive, and the ship began to be quarantined from February 4th. Passengers and crew 
stayed on the ship for two weeks. 
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self-restraint (Jishuku Yosei) in hosting or attending large-scale public events.5  
 The one exception was on February 27th, when the national government 
requested the closures of all elementary, junior, and senior high schools until the 
beginning of the new academic year in April. However, the final decision was left to the 
governor of each prefecture, and some prefectures did not close their schools. No 
restrictions were placed on economic activities. 
While the national government was cautious about declaring a state of 
emergency, several local governments took measures of their own. That said, these were 
also limited in the scope and time frame of regulated activities and, more importantly, 
lacked legal enforcement. On February 28th, the Governor of Hokkaido announced a state 
of emergency, although it lacked legal basis, and requested that residents avoid leaving 
their homes for three weeks.6 The Governor of Osaka also asked for the refrainment of 
movement to and from Hyogo, the neighboring prefecture, between March 20th and 22nd.  
 The low number of RT-PCR tests in Japan is also striking when compared to 
South Korea, which made drive-thru tests available to anyone, including asymptomatic 
people.7 There were two paths for Japanese residents to be tested as of March 2020. First, 
 
5 The Constitution of Japan does not provide for a national state of emergency. As such, 
neither the national nor local governments have the formal authority to require business 
closures, shelter-in-place orders, or citywide lockdowns. However, amendments to the 
Infectious Diseases Control Law on March 13, 2020, newly allowed the Cabinet to 
declare a “soft” state of emergency, which delegates mores authority to prefectural 
governors to contain COVID-19. Even then, governors are restricted to urging (and if 
necessary shaming) businesses and citizens to follow its directives. The “state of 
emergency” referred to in this paper refers to this latter, softer variety. 
6 After this announcement, on March 13th, the National Diet (parliament) amended the 
law so that a state of emergency declaration could be issued. 
7 According to an MHLW report on May 4, 2020, the low number of tests was due to 
the limited capacities of call centers, testing facilities, and medical facilities 
(https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/10900000/000627553.pdf, accessed on May 10, 
2020).  
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those who had “close contact” with an infected person were requested to visit a designated 
medical facility.8 Second, those who did not have close contact but suffered from severe 
symptoms could consult with their family doctor or local public health call center, who 
would then refer the patient to a designated facility, if considered necessary. Only those 
persons whom the facility suspected were infected could take a RT-PCR test, which was 
administered at public health centers or local public health institutions. Therefore, there 
was no way to detect asymptomatic infection except for those who had “close contact”. 
The accuracy of detecting infected people also depended on the screening ability of home 
doctors, call centers, and designated medical facilities. 
Because of these passive policy interventions, economic conditions in Japan did 
not decline as much as in other countries during the first quarter of 2020. Although the 
number of bankruptcies increased from 651 cases in February to 740 in March, as shown 
in Figure A1, only 12 cases were related to COVID-19 (Tokyo Shoko Research, 2020). 
The unemployment rate was also stable between January and March, in contrast to other 
countries experiencing a rapid increase in infections, such as the U.S. and Ireland (Figure 
A2). 
 
3. Data 
This study employs two datasets. First, to approximate the risk of COVID-19 infection, 
we construct prefecture-level monthly panel data on the average number of newly 
confirmed cases per day. We use this information as the main independent variable. 
Because the number of newly confirmed cases is reported daily by the government and 
 
8 A person is categorized to be in close contact with infected persons if he/she (i) 
touches an infected person directly without anti-infective measures, or (ii) meets an 
infected person at a distance of around 2 meters (6 feet) or less. 
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mass media, it is the most easily accessible information for people regarding the infection 
spread. While the ratio of positive-to-negative RT-PCR tests is one alternative measure of 
infection risk, we do not use it for this analysis, because that information was not widely 
disseminated at that time and thus was unlikely to affect behavioral patterns. We similarly 
do not use the number of COVID-19-related deaths, because only a few prefectures 
reported the death toll at that time. 
Second, this study uses data from an original, nationwide online survey.9 The 
first round of the survey was conducted between March 25th and 27th, 2020, with a 
sample size of 2,798 respondents. Our survey targeted those in their 30s and 40s, for two 
reasons. First, working-age individuals account for a high proportion of confirmed cases. 
Second, while the behavior of the elderly, who are most susceptible to COVID-19, is 
undeniably important, it is difficult to collect a representative sample of older generations 
due to disparities in internet access (Ministry of Internal Affair and Communication, 2018 
p156). Our questionnaire was designed to elicit information about both behavior and 
preferences, including the use of social media, political sentiment, health status, actions 
taken to protect oneself and others from COVID-19, perceptions about the severity of 
infection risk, and the assessment of the government’s early responses to COVID-19. On 
April 27th to May 7th, we re-surveyed the same respondents to collect further information 
on their social and psychological traits, such as civic attitudes and social capital, although 
we use these only in Section 6. A total of 2,462 individuals participated in both surveys. 
 
9 A potential drawback to the use of online survey data is sample selection. However, 
we chose this approach because it was difficult to conduct a paper-and-pencil survey in 
a timely manner, due to the spread of COVID-19. An alternative approach is to use 
publicly available data, such as the Google Trends interface and geolocation data from 
mobile phones (Barrios and Hochberg 2020; Gupta et al. 2000). Although these may 
better capture behavioral changes, it is difficult to analyze the reasons for heterogeneity 
in behavior. 
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Table A1 presents the summary statistics of prefecture and respondent characteristics. 
Online Appendix A1 discusses more details about the survey design, such as sampling 
stratification and research ethics. 
The first-round survey data contain three behavioral variables related to social 
distancing, our outcome of interest. The first is frequency of face-to-face conversations 
per day. The second is the number of days per week that respondents used public 
transportation for more than one hour, capturing the frequency of commuting. Third, we 
use the frequency of dining outside per week.10 In this survey, retrospective information 
was collected, based on recall; the dataset contains the information on these variables 
from January to March 2020. From this retrospective information, a monthly pseudo-
panel dataset was compiled. Figure 3 depicts the trend of these variables.  
Our dependent variable is the composite index of these variables constructed by 
a polychoric principal component analysis; the use of polychoric correlations is 
considered best suited for ordinal variables. The summary statistics of the composite 
index is presented in Table A1. 
[Figure 3] 
 
4. Identification Strategy 
4.1. Estimation Model 
This study estimates the following OLS model: 
Ript = α0 + α1 Infpt + α2 Adj_Infpt+ α3 Damagept + δip + Tt + εipt, (1) 
where, Ript denotes the composite index of social-distancing behavior of individual i in 
 
10 The transmission risk from these activities depends on various factors, such as the 
use of masks and physical distance from others, but we did not ask such detailed 
questions to mitigate the respondents’ burdens and ensure a higher response rate. 
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prefecture p in month t. Infpt denotes the monthly average of newly confirmed cases per 
day in the prefecture in which the respondent resides. Adj_Infpt denotes the summation of 
Inf over the adjacent prefectures, to account for high levels of cross-prefectural movement 
in urban areas in particular. Damagept denotes proxies for the economic damages from 
the infection spread, such as the number of bankruptcies and the active job-openings-to-
applicants ratio. Finally, δip and Tt denote respondent and monthly fixed effects, 
respectively. The respondent fixed effects control for those characteristics invariant 
between January and March 2020, including socio-economic conditions at the prefecture 
and individual levels. Monthly fixed effects capture the impact of country-level shocks, 
such as news about the infection spread in other countries and restrictions on overseas 
travel. 
 
4.2. Underlying Assumptions 
4.2.1. No Reverse Causality 
Our identification strategy relies on four assumptions. The first assumption is the absence 
of reverse causality. The residents’ (lack of) social-distancing behavior may affect the 
level of confirmed cases in the prefecture. However, this should cause an upward bias 
between risky behavior and COVID-19 infection counts. Hence, as long as we find a 
negative association between risky behavior and confirmed cases, it should not affect the 
interpretation of results. 
Furthermore, the Japanese government has identified that at least 70% of newly 
confirmed cases between March 1st and 24th were transmitted by those who were 
previously confirmed.11 Therefore, the increase in the confirmed cases in this period was 
 
11 The Japanese government identifies the channel of transmission based on interviews 
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mainly determined by the behavioral patterns of previously confirmed people (only 
0.0002% of national population).12 The social-distancing behavior of most respondents 
should have played a limited role in the increases in confirmed cases. 
 
4.2.2. Parallel Trend Assumption 
The second is the parallel trend assumption, which may be subject to the following two 
issues. First, the number of confirmed cases may grow faster in urban prefectures, which 
have greater testing capacity and population density, and these characteristics may be 
correlated with changes in social-distancing behavior. However, in the time period under 
observation, we expect less social distancing in urban areas, causing an upward bias (less 
social distancing where there are more infections) that runs counter to our hypothesis 
(more social distancing where there are more infection). The frequencies of conversing 
with colleagues, commuting, and dining out are expected to increase in March, 
particularly in large cities, because March is the final month of the fiscal year and work 
hours generally increase. The Statistics Bureau of Japan (2020) finds that in 2018 and 
2019, the revenues of restaurant business increased in March.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 4.2.1, the infection spread in March was 
mainly attributed to the unwitting behavior of infected persons before their diagnosis was 
confirmed, such as the frequency of going to bars before becoming symptomatic. 
Therefore, the socio-economic environment of the prefecture should have played a 
limited role in the increase in confirmed cases in March, if at all. 
 
with confirmed patients. The data on confirmed cases by transmission channels are 
available from https://datastudio.google.com/reporting/c4e0fe88-f72e-464e-a3b8-
5e4e591c238d/page/ultJB?s=oA3tV-uQzaE (accessed on May 8, 2020). 
12 As of the end of February 2020, only 206 cases were confirmed, compared to the 
national population of 126 million. 
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The second potential violation of the parallel trend assumption is that, if the 
timing of infection spread is controllable or predictable, people can prepare for it 
beforehand. Therefore, they may alter their behavior even in the pre-spread period. 
However, this is also unlikely due to difficulties in predicting the timing that infections 
of this novel coronavirus spread accurately. More importantly, these possibilities also 
attenuate the estimated effect of infection risk, i.e. the results would be biased against 
finding statistically significant results. Therefore, it should not affect the interpretation of 
results qualitatively, as long as we find a significantly negative effect. 
To examine the validity of the parallel trend assumption, we conduct a 
falsification test by regressing Ript (social distancing behavior) between December and 
February on the individual fixed effects, monthly fixed effects, and interaction terms 
between monthly fixed effects and the number of confirmed cases in March. Table A2 
shows that the coefficients of interaction terms are statistically jointly insignificant and 
small in magnitude for all the columns.  
One may also be concerned about the ceiling effect. If the level of Ript after 
controlling for the individual fixed effects is already low (i.e. more social distancing) in 
prefectures that subsequently had few confirmed cases in the next month, then Ript may 
be less likely to decrease even further than in prefectures with more cases, regardless of 
the severity of infection spread. We test this possibility by regressing the level of Ript in 
January and February on the number of confirmed cases in the next month, individual 
fixed effects, and monthly fixed effects. A positive coefficient of confirmed cases suggests 
the possibility of ceiling effect, but the estimated coefficient is -0.003 (p-value=0.341), 
ruling out this issue.  
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4.2.3. Limited Impact of Economic Damage and Government Intervention 
The third underlying assumption for this model is that the increase in the number of 
confirmed cases affects individual behavior only through the increase in infection risk, 
but not through associated economic damages or government interventions. This 
assumption is likely to hold: as mentioned in Section 2, economic indicators, such as the 
unemployment rate and number of bankruptcies, were still stable during the survey period. 
Furthermore, using the prefecture-level monthly panel data, we find that the number of 
confirmed cases is not associated with bankruptcy cases or the active job-openings-to-
applicants ratio (Table A3). Finally, our econometric specification controls for these 
economic conditions.  
Regarding government interventions, after the prime minister recommended that 
local governors close schools in March, respondents with a schooling-age child may have 
had to stay home to take care of their children. To rule out this impact, we re-estimate the 
model after excluding respondents with a schooling-age child. In addition, we also drop 
the sample from Hokkaido prefecture, which unilaterally closed schools and encouraged 
residents to shelter in place, in order to eliminate the effects of imposing a state of 
emergency.13  
 
4.2.4. Limited Spillover Effect 
The fourth potential threat to our identification strategy is the spillover effect from other 
prefectures. A spike in COVID-19 cases in one prefecture may elevate perceived risks 
among residents of neighboring prefectures, motivating them to maintain social distance. 
 
13 We do not exclude the sample of Osaka because the request to refrain from cross-
prefecture movement was only in place for three days. 
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This is particularly plausible for those who commute to adjacent prefectures for work. To 
address this potential issue, we control for the number of confirmed cases in the adjacent 
prefectures, Adj_Infpt, in the model. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Benchmark Results 
Table 1 presents the OLS results of Equation (1). It shows that the increase in confirmed 
cases per prefecture is significantly associated with social-distancing behavior. The 
results are robust to the additional control for economic conditions (Column (2)), 
confirmed cases in adjacent prefectures (Columns (3)), and the exclusion of respondents 
with a schooling-age child (Columns (4)). The most preferable specification (Column (4)) 
demonstrates the largest effect size. Hence, changes in economic conditions or 
government interventions cannot explain the significantly negative coefficients of 
confirmed cases. Column (4) shows that a one standard deviation increase in COVID-19 
cases (S.D.=1.91 as of March) is associated with an increase in the degree of social 
distancing by 0.05 standard deviation (S.D.=0.79).  
With regard to other coefficients, the increase in confirmed cases in adjacent 
prefectures also has an effect on social distancing. However, the effect size is one third of 
confirmed cases in one’s own prefecture, and the coefficient becomes insignificant after 
excluding respondents with a schooling-age child. The coefficients of the job-opening-
to-applicants ratio are negative. Although this is purely speculative, this result may be 
because a higher ratio enables individuals to select a job with better working conditions. 
We conduct the following robustness checks. First, people may react to the 
accumulated number of confirmed cases over multiple months, rather than the number of 
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newly confirmed cases in the most recent month. Hence, as an alternative measure of 
infection risk, we re-estimate the model using the accumulated number of confirmed cases 
(Table A4). Second, behavioral patterns may differ between employed and unemployed 
persons, because of differences in the need to use public transportation and have face-to-
face conversations. They may also differ in terms of budget constraints on dining outside. 
To control for these heterogeneities, we re-estimate our models after excluding 
respondents who do not work (Table A5). Third, in Table A6, we use the three ordinal 
social-distancing variables in Figure 3 as the dependent variable and re-estimate the 
models using OLS and interval regression models. The results are robust to all of these 
alternative specifications.  
[Table 1] 
 
5.2. Heterogeneous Effect 
Does the impact of infection risk vary across individuals? In Table 2, we address this 
question by adding interaction terms between confirmed cases and respondent 
characteristics. This model demonstrates significant differences by education level. 
Columns (1) and (2) suggest that the impact of a one standard deviation increase in 
confirmed cases for university and vocational school graduates are larger by 0.07 and 
0.06 standard deviations, respectively, than for high school graduates. The results are 
robust to controls for month-prefecture fixed effects (Columns (3) and (4)) and the 
exclusion of demographic characteristics (Columns (5) and (6)). Therefore, our result is 
unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity at the individual and prefectural levels. 
 Regarding other characteristics, first, we find that women with a schooling-age 
child are more sensitive to the increase in infection risk. Second, the coefficient of 
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interaction with respondents’ age is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude, 
presumably because our sample consists only of those in their 30s and 40s. 
[Table 2] 
 
6. Suggestive Evidence on the Mechanisms of Heterogeneous Impact 
Why are less educated people less sensitive to the risks of COVID-19 infection? We test 
eight potential mechanisms. First, they may engage in a job that is not suitable for 
teleworking, such as in retail or the restaurant business. Second, their economic status 
may be lower, and so they may suffer from credit constraints that make the disutility from 
the income loss caused by staying home larger than for the wealthy. The third potential 
mechanism is that they may not watch television news or read newspapers, and therefore 
have poorer knowledge of COVID-19. Fourth, even if they have knowledge, they may 
still underestimate the infection risk. Because the actual number of infected individuals 
is unobservable, people infer the infection risk from the information available, but news 
related to COVID-19 frequently includes professional, foreign language terms (e.g. RT-
PCR tests). Fifth, they may be less risk averse. Sixth, they may possess less social capital 
than university graduates, and so may care less about their reputation or disapproval from 
neighbors. Seventh, they may take alternative actions to protect themselves, such as 
wearing masks and washing hands with disinfectants. Finally, they may recognize that 
the number of confirmed cases underestimates the actual infection risk, and therefore, 
they may be more sensitive to other types of information, such as the ratio of positive RT-
PCR tests. Among these, the first to fourth channels suggest that the less educated do not 
maintain social distance due to some constraints, whereas the fifth and sixth mechanisms 
imply that they do not keep social distance by intention. These six mechanisms suggest 
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that the less educated are exposed to higher infection risks, and thus could be unwitting 
but significant vectors of COVID-19. 
To test the relevance of the first channel—the unsuitability of certain jobs for 
teleworking—we construct an industry-level proxy using the survey results of Okubo and 
NIRA (2020). Based on an online survey in Japan, this study shows the proportion of 
respondents working at home by industry as of March 2020. We combine these 
proportions and our respondents’ occupation to approximate the suitability of their jobs 
for teleworking.14 We then regress this proxy on respondent characteristics to examine 
whether less educated respondents actually engage in jobs unsuitable for telework. 
Column (1) of Table 3, however, shows that the coefficient for university graduate is 
negative, counter to the hypothesis.15  
Second, to examine the channel through income opportunity costs, we conduct 
a polychoric principal component analysis to construct a composite index of economic 
status from two variables: annual income, and a binary indicator that takes unity for self-
employment, executive, or regular employment.16 We examine the correlation between 
this index and education level in Column (2) of Table 3. It confirms that the economic 
status of university graduates is significantly higher than that for high school graduates, 
in line with our hypothesis. 
 To test the third channel through information access, we construct a composite 
index from three variables: the frequencies of reading paper newspapers, reading 
 
14 The summary statistics of variables used for this section are presented in Table A1.  
15 Okubo and NIRA (2020) also report the proportion of teleworking at the pre-spread 
period (January 2020). Changing the time period for telework suitability does not affect 
our results. 
16 We use the polychoric principal component analysis to construct composite indices 
throughout this section. 
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newspaper websites, and watching television news. Then, we estimate the association 
between this index and education level in Column (3). The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis: educated respondents follow the mass media more frequently. 
 The fourth channel is underestimation of infection risk. We construct a composite 
index of risk perception using the following two questions: how many infected people 
that respondents think there actually are in Japan; the extent to which COVID-19 will 
cause serious problems for themselves. The regression result in Column (4) shows that 
educated people are more likely to take the infection risk more seriously, supporting our 
hypothesis.  
 Fifth, given the difficulty in conducting an economic experiment to elicit the risk 
preference of respondents in our online survey, we test this channel through two proxy 
variables. First, we asked the following question: which of the following two sayings 
characterizes you better, “nothing ventured, nothing gained” or “a wise man never courts 
danger”? The answer options are in Likert-scale. Second, we also asked the following 
question: at which precipitation probability do you bring an umbrella when going out? A 
lower score to these answers indicates greater risk aversion. These questions are 
frequently used in the literature (Ikeda et al. 2016 p142; Iida 2016) and draws from earlier 
work in the United States. In Column (5), we estimate the relationship between the 
composite index of these variables and respondent characteristics, showing that education 
level is uncorrelated with risk preference. 
 Sixth, the second wave of our survey asks about respondents’ social capital 
through six questions on general trust, pure altruism, and social norms. More detail about 
each question is reported in Table A1. We use these answers to construct a composite 
index. Column (6) demonstrates that social capital is lower for less educated respondents, 
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supporting the hypothesis. 
 Seventh, although our survey does not include items on the use of facemasks or 
disinfectant soap, it does ask respondents whether they wished to buy them more than 
usual. We regress the composite index of these variables in Column (7). The result shows 
that highly educated individuals are more likely to answer affirmatively, counter to the 
hypothesis. 
 The eighth hypothesis pertains to respondents having less confidence in the 
confirmed number of infection cases as a proxy for infection risk. This hypothesis 
assumes that those with lower education have more knowledge about COVID-19 than 
educated respondents. This assumption, however, contradicts our findings that less 
educated respondents spend less time collecting information on COVID-19 (Table 3, 
Column (3)). 
 These results so far show that respondents’ education levels are associated with 
economic status, information access, risk perception, and social capital. The observed 
patterns are robust to the full sample estimation (Table A7). These characteristics could 
be potential drivers of the heterogeneous effect of COVID-19 cases. To further test 
whether they are also associated with their social-distancing behavior, we additionally 
control for the interaction terms between these seven indices and the number of confirmed 
cases, based on the specifications in Table 2.  
Table 4 presents the estimation results. It also reports False Discovery Rate q-
values (Anderson 2008) to adjust the p-values of the 14 coefficients that test for different 
mechanisms. We find robust evidence that in prefectures with more confirmed cases, 
those with high risk perception are more likely to maintain social distance. We also find 
significant coefficients for suitability for teleworking, economic status, information 
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access, and risk preference, but they are not robust to changes in sampling (Column (2)) 
or multiple hypothesis testing (q-values). Overall, the results from Tables 3 and 4 support 
the hypothesis that differences in risk perception are the most likely driver of 
heterogeneity across education levels. 
[Table 3] 
[Table 4] 
 
7. Conclusion 
Do people keep social distance to mitigate the infection risk of COVID-19, even in the 
absence of aggressive government intervention? Using unique survey data collected in 
Japan, we find that an increase in the number of confirmed cases is negatively associated 
with the frequency of face-to-face conversation, public transportation use, and dining out. 
However, less educated people do not respond as much as those with higher education. 
We provide suggestive evidence that this heterogeneity is driven primarily by the former’s 
underestimation of infection risk. 
 The following policy implications can be derived. Some countries have lifted 
aggressive regulations before eliminating new COVID-19 infections in order to restart 
economic activities, but concerns remain about how governments will cope with the next 
wave of infections (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Inoue and Todo, 2020; Lin and Meissner, 
2020). Our findings suggest that when the government prioritizes economic activities, 
socio-economically vulnerable individuals are exposed to particularly higher risk, and 
they could also become the primary vectors of the virus. This is consistent with the 
argument of Ahmed et al. (2020). It is, therefore, incumbent upon the government to 
implement a targeted intervention for this subpopulation promptly.  
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One approach is for governments to provide information on the risks of infection 
transmission in an easily accessible and understandable manner. Another promising 
approach is interventions that incorporate nudges to elevate risk perceptions. Van Bavel 
et al. (2020) argue in favor of nudges in eradicating COVID-19. Whether these policies 
are complements or substitutes in encouraging social-distancing behavior depend on how 
risk perception and health knowledge are formed. Further studies are required to design 
the optimal combination of these policies. 
 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Chernozhukov, V., Werning, I., & Whinston, M. D., (2020). A Multi-Risk 
SIR Model with Optimally Targeted Lockdown, (No. w27102). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Adler, N. E., & Newman, K. (2002). Socioeconomic disparities in health: pathways and 
policies. Health Affairs, 21(2), 60-76.  
Ahmed, F., Ahmed, N. E., Pissarides, C., & Stiglitz, J. (2020). Why inequality could 
spread COVID-19. The Lancet Public Health. 
Apostolidis, T., Fieulaine, N., Simonin, L., & Rolland, G. (2006). Cannabis use, time 
perspective and risk perception: Evidence of a moderating effect. Psychology and 
Health, 21(5), 571-592.  
Balia, S., & Jones, A. M. (2008). Mortality, lifestyle and socio-economic status. Journal 
of Health Economics, 27(1), 1-26.  
Barari, S., Caria, S., Davola, A., Falco, P., Fetzer, T., Fiorin, S., ... & Kraft-Todd, G. (2020). 
Evaluating COVID-19 Public Health Messaging in Italy: Self-Reported Compliance 
and Growing Mental Health Concerns. medRxiv.  
Barrios, J. M., & Hochberg, Y. (2020). Risk perception through the lens of politics in the 
time of the COVID-19 pandemic (No. w27008). National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2020). Social Distancing, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-
distancing.html (accessed on May 22, 2020). 
Cutler, D. M., Lleras-Muney, A., & Vogl, T. (2008). Socioeconomic status and health: 
23 
 
dimensions and mechanisms (No. w14333). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Doorslaer, E. V., Koolman, X., & Jones, A. M. (2004). Explaining income‐related 
inequalities in doctor utilisation in Europe. Health Economics, 13(7), 629-647.  
Fenichel, E. P. (2013). Economic considerations for social distancing and behavioral 
based policies during an epidemic. Journal of Health Economics, 32(2), 440-451. 
Fenichel, E. P., Castillo-Chavez, C., Ceddia, M. G., Chowell, G., Parra, P. A. G., Hickling, 
G. J., ... & Springborn, M. (2011). Adaptive human behavior in epidemiological 
models. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(15), 6306-6311. 
Glaeser, Edward L., David I. Laibson, José A. Scheinkman and Christine L. Soutter. 2000. 
Measuring Trust, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 811-846. 
Gupta, S., Nguyen, T. D., Rojas, F. L., Raman, S., Lee, B., Bento, A., ... & Wing, C. (2020). 
Tracking public and private response to the covid-19 epidemic: Evidence from state 
and local government actions (No. w27027). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Hale, T., Petherick, A., Phillips, T., & Webster, S. (2020). Variation in government 
responses to COVID-19. Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper, 31. 
Iida, T. (2016). Yūkensha no Risuku Taido to Tōhyōkōdō. Bokutakusha. 
Ikeda, S., Kato, H. K., Ohtake, F., & Tsutsui, Y. (Eds.). (2016). Behavioral Economics of 
Preferences, Choices, and Happiness. Springer. 
Inoue, H. and Todo, Y., 2020. The propagation of the economic impact through supply 
chains: The case of a mega-city lockdown against the spread of COVID-19. 
Available at SSRN 3564898.  
Ipsen, J. (1959). Social distance in epidemiology: age of susceptible siblings as the 
determining factor in household infectivity of measles. Human Biology, 31(2), 162-
179. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of 
representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 430–454. 
Kawachi, I., Adler, N. E., & Dow, W. H. (2010). Money, schooling, and health: 
Mechanisms and causal evidence. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 
Kristenson, M., Eriksen, H. R., Sluiter, J. K., Starke, D., & Ursin, H. (2004). 
Psychobiological mechanisms of socioeconomic differences in health. Social 
Science & Medicine, 58(8), 1511-1522. 
Kushner Gadarian, Shana and Goodman, Sara Wallace and Pepinsky, Thomas B., 
Partisanship, Health Behavior, and Policy Attitudes in the Early Stages of the 
COVID-19 Pandemic (March 27, 2020). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562796  
Lin, W., & Sloan, F. (2015). Risk perceptions and smoking decisions of adult Chinese 
24 
 
men. Journal of Health Economics, 39, 60-73.  
Lin, Z & Meissner, C. M. (2020) Health vs. Wealth? Public Health Policies and the 
Economy During Covid-19, (No. w27099). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Lundborg, P., & Andersson, H. (2008). Gender, risk perceptions, and smoking behavior. 
Journal of Health Economics, 27(5), 1299-1311. 
Machida, M., Nakamura, I., Saito, R., Nakaya, T., Hanibuchi, T., Takamiya, T., Odagiri, 
Y., Fukushima, N., Kikuchi, H., Kojima, T. and Watanabe, H., (2020). Adoption of 
personal protective measures by ordinary citizens during the COVID-19 outbreak in 
Japan. International Journal of Infectious Diseases.  
Maurer, J. (2009). Who has a clue to preventing the flu? Unravelling supply and demand 
effects on the take-up of influenza vaccinations. Journal of Health Economics, 28(3), 
704-717. 
Ministry of Internal Affair and Communication, (2018) “The White Paper on Information 
and Communications in Japan,” Ministry of Internal Affair and Communication. 
Muto, K., Yamamoto, I., Nagasu, M., Tanaka, M., & Wada, K. (2020). Japanese citizens' 
behavioral changes and preparedness against COVID-19: How effective is Japan's 
approach of self-restraint?. medRxiv.  
Okubo, T., & NIRA (2020). Shingata Corona Virus no Kansen Kakudai ga Telework wo 
Katsuyoshita Hatarakikata, Seikatsu, Ishiki nado ni Oyobosu Eikyo ni Kansuru 
Chosa Kekka ni kansuru Houkokusho, https://www.nira.or.jp/pdf/NIRA20200430-
telemigration1.pdf (accessed on May 14, 2020). 
Riad, J. K., Norris, F. H., & Ruback, R. B. (2006). Predicting evacuation in two major 
disasters: risk perception, social influence, and access to Resources. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology 29(5), 918-934. 
Schaller, J., Schulkind, L., & Shapiro, T. (2019). Disease outbreaks, healthcare utilization, 
and on-time immunization in the first year of life. Journal of Health Economics, 67, 
102212. 
The Statistics Bureau of Japan. (2020). Service Sangyo Doko Chosa. 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/mssi/kekka/pdf/m2002.pdf (accessed on May 14, 2020). 
Tokyo Shoko Research, (2020). Getsuji Zenkoku Kigyo Tosan Jokyo. https://www.tsr-
net.co.jp/news/status/monthly/202003.html (accessed on May 9, 2020). 
Van Bavel, J. J., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., ... & 
Drury, J. (2020). Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 
pandemic response. Nature Human Behaviour, 1-12. 
WHO (2020). “Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 1,” 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-
25 
 
reports (Accessed on April 25th, 2020).  
Williams, D. R., Yu, Y., Jackson, J. S., & Anderson, N. B. (1997). Racial differences in 
physical and mental health: Socio-economic status, stress and discrimination. 
Journal of Health Psychology, 2(3), 335-351. 
Winkleby, M. A., Jatulis, D. E., Frank, E., & Fortmann, S. P. (1992). Socioeconomic status 
and health: how education, income, and occupation contribute to risk factors for 
cardiovascular disease. American Journal of Public Health, 82(6), 816-820. 
Zhou‐Richter, T., Browne, M. J., & Gründl, H. (2010). Don't they care? or, are they just 
unaware? risk perception and the demand for long‐term care insurance. Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, 77(4), 715-747. 
  
26 
 
 
Note: The passengers and crew of the Diamond Princess are not included. 
Source: MHLW (https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/index.html) 
Figure 1: Infection Spread in Japan 
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Note: The passengers and crew of the Diamond Princess are not included. 
Source: MHLW (https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/index.html) 
Figure 2: Cumulative Number of Confirmed Cases 
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Figure 3: Trend of Social-Distancing Behavior 
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Table 1: The Impact of Infection Spread on Social-Distancing Behavior 
Dependent Variable: Composite Index of Conversation, Public Transportation, 
and Dining Out 
Sample: All All All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Confirmed cases -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) Confirmed cases   -0.006* -0.004 
   in adjacent prefectures   (0.003) (0.004) 
Bankruptcy cases  0.623 0.641 0.869 
  (0.571) (0.570) (0.649) 
Job-openings- to-applicants ratio  -0.318*** -0.280** -0.328** 
     (0.120) (0.118) (0.145) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,723 7,723 7,723 5,411 
Number of respondents 2,598 2,598 2,598 1,819 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 2: Heterogeneous Effect 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confirmed cases 0.014 0.026     
 (0.026) (0.029)     
Confirmed cases -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.026*** 
  x University (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Confirmed cases -0.024*** -0.023** -0.022** -0.021** -0.027*** -0.024** 
  x Vocational (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Confirmed cases 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000   
  x Age (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
Confirmed cases -0.016** -0.007 -0.016** -0.008   
  x Female (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)   
Confirmed cases -0.010  -0.011    
 x Live with schooling-age child (0.008)  (0.008)    
Monthly Fixed Effect Yes Yes No No No No 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes No No No No 
Month-Prefecture Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,558 5,348 7,558 5,348 7,657 5,369 
Number of respondents 2,540 1,796 2,540 1,796 2,574 1,803 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: The Relationship Between Education and Socio-Economic Indices 
(Samples with no schooling-age child) 
 
Suitability 
of job for 
teleworking 
Economic 
status 
Information 
access 
Risk 
perception 
Risk 
preference 
Social 
capital 
Alternative 
protective 
measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
University  -0.101*** 0.642*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.026 0.500*** 0.170*** 
 (0.024) (0.054) (0.061) (0.058) (0.041) (0.064) (0.048) Vocational -0.047 0.258*** 0.147*** 0.117* 0.038 0.390*** 0.214*** 
 (0.035) (0.066) (0.053) (0.060) (0.070) (0.081) (0.056) Age  -0.001 -0.005** 0.023*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) Female  0.157*** -0.427*** -0.124*** -0.073 -0.213*** 0.262*** 0.387*** 
 (0.021) (0.048) (0.044) (0.047) (0.041) (0.058) (0.046) Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,465 1,586 1,798 1,785 1,790 1,451 1,787 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in 
parentheses. The sample sizes of Columns (1) and (6) are smaller than the others, because 
the data on respondents’ occupation and social capital were collected in the second-wave 
survey. Column (2) also has a small sample size due to missing values in the annual 
income data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: The Relationship Between Socio-Economic Indices and Social-Distancing 
Behavior 
Sample: All No child 
 (1) (2) 
     
Confirmed cases -0.029*  -0.025  
  x Suitability of job for teleworking (0.016) [0.163] (0.017) [0.163] 
Confirmed cases -0.010**  -0.007  
  x Economic status (0.005) [0.137] (0.005) [0.163] 
Confirmed cases -0.006  -0.012**  
x Information access (0.005) [0.249] (0.005) [0.137] 
Confirmed cases -0.011***  -0.012***  
  x Risk perception (0.004) [0.022] (0.004) [0.022] 
Confirmed cases -0.009*  -0.008  
  x Risk preference (0.005) [0.137] (0.005) [0.163] 
Confirmed cases -0.004  -0.001  
  x Social capital (0.003) [0.163] (0.003) [0.275] 
Confirmed cases -0.000  -0.000  
  x Alternative protective measures (0.005) [0.378] (0.005) [0.378] 
Confirmed cases -0.012  -0.017**  
  x University (0.008)  (0.009)  
Confirmed cases -0.019*  -0.020  
  x Vocational (0.011)  (0.013)  
Confirmed cases 0.000  -0.000  
  x Age (0.001)  (0.001)  
Confirmed cases -0.020**  -0.008  
  x Female (0.008)  (0.009)  
Confirmed cases -0.017    
  x Live with schooling-age child (0.010)    
Month-Prefecture Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  
Individual Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  
Observations 5,148  3,654  
Number of respondents 1,732  1,228  
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. Anderson’s (2008) q-values that adjust the p-values of 14 coefficients are 
in brackets. The sample size is smaller than Table 2, because the data on respondents’ 
occupation and social capital were collected in the second-wave survey. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Online Appendices  
Appendix 1: Further Discussion on the Survey Design 
Our survey targeted those in their 30s and 40s. Respondents were recruited by Rakuten 
Insight, which has 2.2 million registrants. Among them, we conducted a quota sampling 
with regard to gender (two categories), age group (four 5-year categories), and location 
of residence (10 categories), so that the distribution of these characteristics was 
comparable to that of the Japanese population. In collecting the data, Rakuten Insight 
invited approximately 50,000 randomly selected registrants who matched the sampling 
criteria. The online survey was open until we obtained the required sample size. Therefore, 
it is difficult to compute the response rate. The respondents received some tokens for 
shopping at Rakuten.com as financial incentive. After dropping the sample of Hokkaido 
prefecture, the sample size is 2,637 for the first round, of which 2,293 participated in both 
rounds. We obtained informed consent from the respondents. This survey was approved 
by the Research Ethics Committee of the Institute of Social Science in the University of 
Tokyo.  
 Table A1 presents the summary statistics of respondent characteristics. Among 
employed workers, temporary employment accounts for 26.6%. According to the Labor 
Force Survey, a nationally representative survey conducted by Japanese government, the 
corresponding statistic is 28.7%, supporting the representativeness of our survey data. 
However, it should be noted that 51.8% of respondents are university graduates, while the 
School Basic Survey predicts 35.7% for these birth cohorts. This suggests that our dataset 
may oversample those with higher socio-economic status. 
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 Source: https://www.tsr-net.co.jp/news/status/monthly/index.html  
Figure A1: The Trend in Bankruptcy Cases: Jan 2019 – Mar 2020 
 
 Source: https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/sokuhou/tsuki/index.html  
Figure A2: The Trend in Unemployment Rate: Jan 2019 – Mar 2020 
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Table A1: Prefecture and Respondent Characteristics 
 Obs. Mean S.D. 
Prefecture Characteristics    
Confirmed cases in the prefecture (per day)    
January 2020 2,637 0.011 0.024 
February 2020 2,637 0.306 0.441 
March 2020 2,637 1.705 1.905 
Bankruptcy cases (thousand cases)    
January 2020 2,637 0.039 0.039 
February 2020 2,637 0.035 0.041 
March 2020 2,637 0.040 0.045 
Job-openings- to-applicants ratio    
January 2020 2,637 1.532 0.263 
February 2020 2,637 1.496 0.269 
March 2020 2,637 1.439 0.253 
Respondent Characteristics    
Age  2,624 40.635 5.747 
Female  2,634 0.498  
Live with schooling-age child 2,598 0.291  
Schooling 2,608   
  High school or lower  0.223  
  Vocational/ Jr college  0.259  
University or higher  0.518  
Social Distancing    
Composite index of social distance 7,723 -0.656 0.771 
Socio-Economic Characteristics    
Suitability of job for teleworking 2,103 0.229 0.325 
Occupation 2,616   
Executive / Self-employed   0.093  
Regular employment  0.539  
Temporary employment  0.195  
Homemaker  0.115  
  No job  0.040  
  Others  0.018  
Income 2,283 3.526 1.433 
(1) Less than 2 million, (2) 2 - 4 million, (3) 4 - 6 million, (4) 6 - 8 million, 
(5) 8 - 10 million, (6) More than 10 million     
Read newspaper 2,613 1.866 1.242 
(1) Rarely, (2) 1-3/week, (3) 4-6/week, (4) Daily    
Read web newspaper 2,616 2.077 1.297 
(1) Rarely, (2) 1-3/week, (3) 4-6/week, (4) Daily    
Watch TV news 2,629 3.412 1.009 
(1) Rarely, (2) 1-3/week, (3) 4-6/week, (4) Daily    
Estimate of the actual number of infected people in Japan (x 103) 2,588 3.910 2.135 
(1) Less than 2,000, (2) 2,001-5,000, (3) 5,001-20,000, (4) More than 20,000    
COVID-19 causes serious problems for self 2,632 4.072 0.997 
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(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
Precipitation probability above which you would carry an umbrella (%) 2,637 51.600 19.468 
Which of these sayings characterizes you better?  2,600 2.495 1.293 
(A) Nothing ventured, nothing gained. (B) A wise man never courts danger.    
(1) B, (2) Lean B, (3) Neutral, (4) Lean A, (5) A    
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted? 2,097 3.048 1.059 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to do something for the good of society. 2,093 3.530 0.984 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to help people nearby and care for their well-being 2,096 3.633 0.979 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to always behave properly. 2,096 4.141 0.881 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong. 2,097 3.063 1.001 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
I often donate. 2,098 2.327 1.090 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
Tried to buy masks more than usual? (1) Yes, (0) No 2,610 0.500 0.500 
Tried to buy disinfectant soaps more than usual? (1) Yes, (0) No 2,604 0.321 0.467 
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Table A2: Falsification Test 
 (1) 
February -0.033*** 
 (0.008) 
February x -0.004 
Confirmed cases in March (0.003) 
February x  0.000 
Confirmed cases in adjacent prefectures in March (0.002) 
Constant -0.608*** 
 (0.003) 
Monthly FE Yes 
Individual FE Yes 
P-values of F-test for joint significance of 
interaction terms 0.470 
Observations 5,150 
Number of respondents 2,593 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A3: The Impact of Infection Spread on Economic Conditions 
 Bankruptcies 
Job-openings- to-
applicants ratio 
 (1) (2) 
Confirmed cases 0.696 0.00012 
 (1.544) (0.00423) Monthly FE Yes Yes 
Prefecture FE Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 15.35 1.42 
Observations 141 141 
Number of prefectures 47 47 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4: Using the Cumulative Number of Confirmed Cases 
Sample: All No child 
 (1) (2) 
Cumulative number of  -0.749*** -0.915*** 
confirmed cases (0.172) (0.208) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes 
Observations 7,723 5,411 
Number of respondents 2,598 1,819 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table A5: Exclusion of Unemployed Respondents 
Sample: All No child 
 (1) (2) 
Confirmed cases -0.016*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) Monthly FE Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes 
Observations 6,536 4,550 
Number of respondents 2,197 1,528 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A6: Ordinal Dependent Variables 
OLS Conversation Commute Dining 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confirmed cases -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.008* -0.010** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Prefecture FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,830 5,476 7,799 5,458 7,855 5,494 
Number of respondents 2,613 1,827 2,619 1,832 2,624 1,835 
       
Interval Regression Conversation Commute Dining 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Confirmed cases -0.076*** -0.091*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.014* -0.018** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Prefecture FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,830 5,476 7,799 5,458 7,855 5,494 
Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A7: The Association Between Education and Socio-Economic Characteristics 
(Full Sample) 
 
Suitability 
of job for 
teleworking 
Economic 
status 
Information 
access 
Risk 
perception 
Risk 
preference 
Social 
capital 
Alternative 
protective 
measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
University  -0.084*** 0.597*** 0.216*** 0.263*** -0.080** 0.400*** 0.124*** 
 (0.020) (0.040) (0.045) (0.052) (0.037) (0.052) (0.040) Vocational -0.047* 0.199*** 0.140*** 0.129** -0.035 0.350*** 0.155*** 
 (0.026) (0.040) (0.045) (0.055) (0.046) (0.071) (0.047) Age  -0.001 -0.001 0.022*** 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) Female  0.170*** -0.579*** -0.137*** -0.125*** -0.214*** 0.192*** 0.364*** 
 (0.019) (0.046) (0.049) (0.036) (0.031) (0.051) (0.038) 
Live with  -0.023 0.205*** 0.175*** 0.024 0.059 0.271*** 0.169*** 
schooling-age child (0.017) (0.046) (0.036) (0.035) (0.050) (0.072) (0.029) 
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,054 2,256 2,543 2,527 2,536 2,038 2,534 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in 
parentheses. The sample sizes of Columns (1) and (6) are smaller than the others, because 
the data on respondents’ occupation and social capital were collected in the second-wave 
survey. Column (2) also has a small sample size due to missing values for annual income. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
